Tag Archives: militārā izlūkošana

Mūs atkal saskaitīs (papildināts 16.06.)


  • DoD should conduct a legal review and establish clear policies on the use ofsocial media analysis to support information operations. It should also formulate clear guidelines on data collection, storage, and dissemination.
  • DoD should directly connect efforts to expand its social media analysis capability with existing information-related capabilities and current threats and operational needs.
  • DoD should weigh the costs and benefits of using open-source versus commercial technologies and training military personnel to conduct social media analysis versus relying on contractors to perform these tasks.

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vara bungas: Tāda sajūta ka soc. tīklu analīzei nopietni ķersies klāt visi , gan svešie, gan savējie, gan neitrālie. Analīzēs mūs te visus “across un poperjok”, jo  ko gan viņiem vēl LV segmentā analizēt? Karstās diskusijas ar “Lielisko” iekš sargs.lv?… Ko, bļin, tādu izdomāt, lai izjauktu šos plānus?

UPD1 “Поступающие на службу по контракту в российскую армию соискатели должны будут отчитаться за свои соцсети и активность в интернете за три предыдущих календарных года.”

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UPD2 Laba, bet nedaudz aprauta intervija

[..] Если выбрать 2 круга вокруг человека в соцсети (друзья и друзья друзей, всего примерно 50 тыс. аккаунтов), то можно создать подробную картинку – чем человек дышит, чем увлекается.[..]

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Dienas grauds


[..] Senator Perdue: Russia in the last five years has dramatically increased its global footprint. They have Mirmansk, Kaliningrad, Crimea, and now, Tartus and Latakia on the coast of Syria. What does our intelligence say that Russia intends to do having encircled that part of the world with those major bases?

Lt. Gen. Stewart: The “encirclement” as you describe it—the Western anti-axis barrier—runs from the Arctic through Mirmansk, through Kaliningrad, Crimea, and down. [Russia’s military buildup] is to break out of the “encirclement”—their words—caused by NATO countries in their near abroad. So again, the Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) capability is to increase the cost of any U.S./NATO action against Russia, and to protect and give them buffer space. I don’t think they’re done. I think they’d like to extend that barrier down through the Mediterranean. I’m worried about actions that they might take in Libya to increase that barrier. But that is about breaking out of the NATO encirclement. [..]

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vara bungas: jā, Lībija… btw ģenerālis Stjuarts ir Defence Intelligence Agency direktors – galvenais US armijas izlūks.

Dzēst


What is not mentioned in this story is that if the Russian soldiers are transmitting through these cell towers, the Russians are also listening – intercepting their communications. The Russian LEER-3 communications systems are relatively cheap, can put out propaganda directly to soldier’s phones, can intercept their communications, track where the cell phones are located […]

via Russian Military Apparently Using Cell Tower Spoofers To Send Propaganda Directly To Ukrainian Soldiers’ Phones — To Inform is to Influence

100K zem palielināmā stikla


“[..] The officials said the U.S. will keep a close eye on the Russian exercise, called Zapad, which will take place in Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave, wedged between Lithuania and Poland, and the western section of the country. They said the U.S. will have an enhanced presence in the region at that time to monitor whether Russia uses the exercise as an opportunity to mass troops and equipment there and leave some behind when it’s over.

The officials, who were not authorized to discuss the matter publicly and spoke on condition of anonymity, said Russia could have as many as 100,000 troops in the region for the exercise. [..]”

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vara bungas: Izskatās, ka sasprinzinājums Zapad mācību laikā būs leilāks kā parasti (2009, 2013), tomēr ir pamats domāt, ka  RU spēki šoreiz BY teritorijā neaizkavēsies, par to liecina vairāki signāli sākot ar amatpersonu izteikumiem, Minskas retoriku  un beidzot ar miljardu USD aizdevumu, ko kremlis uzdāvināja Lukašenko, lai viņš atdotu savu parādu Gazpromam. Šādus valdības kredītus RU parasti ar laiku  noraksta. Tas nozīmē, ka kaut kāda vienošanās ir  panākta.  Manā skatījumā Maskava pati atbalstīs histēriju par “mācību karaspēka neizvešanu no BY”, tad demonstratīvi to izvedīs, daži eksperti nokaunēsies un kaisīs pelnus, bet nākamais solis būs pēkšņa vienošanās (paziņojums)  par RU sauszemes karaspēka bāzi BY. Eksperti atkal kaunēsies un kaisīs pelnus. Šāda shēma visnotaļ iederās kremļa stilā.

Interesanti kā izpaudīsies “enhanced presence”, iespējams ar to ir domāta “Patriot” raķešu diviziona izvietošana LT  PGA mācību Tobruk Legacy ietvaros jūlijā, bet tomēr ņemot vērā RU karaspēka koncentraciju būtu adekvāts solis  sārīkot  asimetriskas SzK mācības, paceļot un noliekot  arī mūsu “17 500 militāri sagatvotus karavīrus” (c) šaipus Zilupei. Zinu arī kādēļ tas nenotiks – ” lai nepalielinātu spriedzi   kaimiņvalstu attiecībās”.

Dienas grauds


[..] Second, we need better quality and more robust situational awareness as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets. This capability needs not only to exist, but a proper reporting mechanism at the highest political and military levels needs to swiftly function in the alliance and the capitals. In essence, alliance members need a solid multinational tool that will provide a reliable, accurate, measured and soberly analyzed intelligence capability right on NATO’s eastern borders—from the North in Norway, via the Baltic states and the Suwałki gap, down to Romania and Turkey. In today’s security environment a well-functioning indicator and warning mechanism, able to distinguish true posture and intentions from maskirovka, becomes a key capability. [..]

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varabungas: Grandiozi plāni vai ne? Esmu gatavs parakstīties zem katra vārda. Aiz loga  2017.gads. t.i. gandrīz 10 gadi pēc Gruzijas-Krievijas kara, bet  tie joprojām ir plāni. Kāds var iedomāties kā uz visu šo NATO bardaku MI jomā noskatījās mūsu oponenti un vispār lietpratēji? Smīkņā kā minimums.

Agresīvā vidē,  kurā atrodoties  mehanisma detaļai  nav  darba (kaujas) uzdevumu, bet ir biezs špakteles (slepenības) slānis metālā izrūsē pamatīgi  caurumi caur kuriem var sanākt sāpīga caurkrišana.

Incoming RANDs


[..] The Department of Defense should take a serious look at Russian capabilities to politically subvert a Baltic state, including the seizure of a border enclave and/or fomenting internal unrest. DoD could use political-military games to understand the potential Alliance difficulties in reaching consensus, the options open to NATO, and the time required. More-detailed assessment of the Baltic internal security forces and their ability to deal with potential subversion contingencies also would be valuable.

  • DoD should seek a better understanding of the Russian ability to prevent reinforcement to the Baltic States; DoD could subject some of the “unusual” scenarios, like the seizure of Gotland, to modeling and simulation. Similarly, for sustained air operations over the Baltic States, how important does access to Swedish (and possibly Finnish) airspace become?
  • DoD should seek a clear view of the role that Kaliningrad might play, with its strong antiair defenses; how would NATO neutralize them? [..]

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Turpināt lasīt

Tur zūd, šeit rodas (papildināts 01.05.)


vara bungas: RU Melnās jūras flote  pazaudēja Bosforā savu SIGINT izlūkkuģi  “Liman” (aprīkojumā kā minimums: 2 НРЛС «Дон», радиопеленгатор АРП-50Р, ОГАС МГ-329 «Шексна», ГАС звукоподводной связи МГ-13, ГАС звукоподводной связи МГ-26 «Хоста», аппаратура РР и РТР «Виток-АК», МРР-1-7, «Вахта-М,10,12», «Визит-М», «Ротор-Н», «Узел», «Кайра».). Tādas pašas  861M modifikācijas radioizlūkošanas  kuģis darbojas Baltijas jūrā zem nosaukuma “Andromeda” un  izskatās pavisam nevainīgi.  Raksturīga pazīme antenu “jūra” uz vidējās virsbūves. Tajā pat laikā uz tā borta var atrasties  līdz 90 cilvēkiem apkalpes, no kuriem tikai 11 ir “jūras jūrnieki”.   Interesanti, ka visiem izlūkiem vietas glābšanas laivās nav paredzētas 🙂 , jo citādi tas būtu demaskējošs faktors. Lielo izlūku skaitu uz borta apstiprina Turcija, kas ziņo par 78 izglābtajiem Bosforā.

Tomēr krievi nebēdā, aizvietotājs sen ir padomā un pēc kāda gada viss būs labāk kā bija . Te gan jāsaka, ka 18280 projekta  “sakaru kuģi” “Ivan Hurs” bija plānots nodot ekspluatācijā vēl 2016.gadā, bet, ja tagad ir runā par “nolaists uz ūdeni”, tas nozīmē, ka gatavs tikai  korpuss un līdz gatavībai stāties ierindā tur vēl ļoti tālu. Tas nozīmē nopietnu pāris gadus igaru robu RU vispārējās SIGINT  spējās, jo neapšaubāmi, ka uz Vidusjūru tulīt  atdzīs kādu aizvietotāju no Tālajiem austrumiem vai Baltijas. Tad arī redzēsim, kas RU šobrīd NAV izlūkošanas prioritāte ; ) .

Pa to laiku …

Turpināt lasīt

Padomnieka padomi


vara bungas: No 03:00 parādās normāla skaņa, kam slinkums iedziļināties, te būs konspekts, ko teica Filips Karbers saviem studentiem.

Turpināt lasīt

Dienas grauds


“[..] We can never afford the number of people it will take just to have humans go through everything that we [military intelligence] collect. Technology has got to get ahead of that for us”[..]”

Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley, the U.S. Army‘s deputy chief of staff of G-2

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vara bungas: XXI gs izlūkvads tas ir tehnoloģijas vispirms, lielas mugursomas un tālie pārgājieni pēc tam.

OSINT instrumentu kastei


[..] How Can We Monitor The Evolution Of The Online Protest?

As open source researchers know, and as mentioned previously in this case study, social media platforms come with vastly different ease of access to their data. Facebook’s API makes it practically impossible to extract data for external manipulation. Twitter, however, presents interesting opportunities to explore topics by automating the data collection via API. This can be done through a variety of means – most notably custom Python scripts – but for the sake of simplicity, and ease of visualization, this time we will use a platform readily available: TAGS (Twitter Archive Google Spreadsheets), by Martin Hawksey.

TAGS, after a quick set up (you need an active Twitter account to link to every new spreadsheet), allows the researcher to explore tweets around specific hashtags, keywords, or from target users. For this case study, we will focus on one of the four main hashtags located via Trendsmap, and we’ll try to understand its pattern of diffusion. [..]

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