Tag Archives: A2/AD

Strategic depth and Alliances


Corporal Frisk

“American newspaper – the concept of strategic depth: Finland could withdraw to Sweden if attacked”

That is the headline chosen by Finnish news source Verkkouutiset when retelling Jane’s Defence Weekly’s recent story that the Swedish Air Force has been working on a concept of enabling Finnish fighters to operate from Swedish bases in times of crises. The idea is both extremely radical, and blatantly obvious, a combination uncomfortably common in Finnish national security.

In short, the interviewed officer was colonel Magnus Liljegren, responsible for the production of Swedish air units and equipment at the Swedish Defence Forces’ general staff (designated C PROD FLYG in the Swedish Defence Forces). The colonel stated that “Finland is absolutely our top priority partner right now […] they are looking to us in order to increase their operational depth. If they need to withdraw they can move into our country and use our bases.” (full…

Skatīt ziņu 1  544 more words

Dienas grauds


[..] Senator Perdue: Russia in the last five years has dramatically increased its global footprint. They have Mirmansk, Kaliningrad, Crimea, and now, Tartus and Latakia on the coast of Syria. What does our intelligence say that Russia intends to do having encircled that part of the world with those major bases?

Lt. Gen. Stewart: The “encirclement” as you describe it—the Western anti-axis barrier—runs from the Arctic through Mirmansk, through Kaliningrad, Crimea, and down. [Russia’s military buildup] is to break out of the “encirclement”—their words—caused by NATO countries in their near abroad. So again, the Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) capability is to increase the cost of any U.S./NATO action against Russia, and to protect and give them buffer space. I don’t think they’re done. I think they’d like to extend that barrier down through the Mediterranean. I’m worried about actions that they might take in Libya to increase that barrier. But that is about breaking out of the NATO encirclement. [..]

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vara bungas: jā, Lībija… btw ģenerālis Stjuarts ir Defence Intelligence Agency direktors – galvenais US armijas izlūks.

Kursa


… ko viņi darīja, kam viņi ticēja, kas viņus darīja spēcīgus un no kā viņi krita.

 

Vēji Baltijas jūras reģionā


[..] Broadly speaking, two scenarios for a Russian campaign in the BSR (Baltic Sea Reģion) appear possible:

  1. A low-key, possibly opportunistic, campaign that exploits real or manufactured discontent among Russian compatriots to destabilize one or more of the Baltic States, creating a “frozen conflict” that undermines NATO’s credibility; or

  2. A more structured, high-tempo campaign to achieve the same objectives against NATO power in the BSR and also render Nordic defense cooperation redundant.

It is reasonable to assume that the Baltic Sea Fleet and other organs of Russian maritime power will play supporting rather than leading roles in any such conflict. [..]

vara bungas:  Labs ieskats RU hibridkara spējās  Baltijas jūras reģiona griezumā. Var piekrist autoriem par RU Baltijas flotes sekundāro nozīmi eventuālās hibrīdās agresijas gadījumā.  Jūras ceļu blokāde tas ir maksimums.

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Reportedly


[..] Sweden is reportedly preparing hundreds of nuclear war shelters to prepare for a potential attack from Russia amid growing concerns in the Baltics. [..] 350 civilian bunkers on the Baltic Sea island of Gotland [..]

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Turpināt lasīt

Barometrs


vara bungas: Avots atklāti prokremlisks, bet par Karalaučiem izklāsta pareizi. Sekojot izmaiņām Kaļiņingradas grupējuma order of battle, iespējams nojaust RU gatavību karam, bet novērojot mūsu neitrālo kaimiņu militāro uzvedību Gotlandē un Olandes salās var uzminēt to, ko viņi zina, bet nevienam nestāsta. Pagaidām trends ir vērsts uz konflikta situācijas eskalāciju, bet līdz reālām ziepēm vēl tālu… 7 no 10,  kā nesen tica viens ģenerālis.

Turpināt lasīt

1990.gads Gotlande


Gotlandes artilērijas pulka (1881-2000)  mācības

vara bungas: Kadrā darbojas zviedru 1990. gada OMD  karavīri, bet ļoti atgādina mūsu ZS šodien 🙂 Izņemot protams savā ziņā unikālas velkamās Bofors 105 mm haubices Haubits M/4140, kas tika saražotas nelielā daudzumā un netika eksportētas.

Jāatzīmē, ka Aukstā kara laikā SE krasta apsardzes vienības  skaitījās pildot kaujas uzdevumu un tādēļ tika uzturētas augstā kaujas gatavībā un regulāri pārbaudītas mācībās. Jā, arī ziemā…

SE krasta apsardzības  sistēmā Gotlande bija viens no galvenajiem elementiem, kāds paliek arī šodien neskatoties uz īslaicīgu “prātu aptumsumu” pēc Aukstā kara beigām, kad Gotlande tika pilnībā demilitarizēta.

vēl par Gotlandes aizsardzības spēku vēsturi

Vizualizēts A2/AD


vara bungas: Labāk vienu reizi A2/AD kupolus ieraudzīt, nekā simts reizes par to dzirdēt.  Karte ir interaktīva. Jāpiezīmē, ka autori vadījās no konservatīviem pieņēmumiem par RU raķešu tāldarbību.

“…In the event of a crisis, such deployments would complicate NATO’s ability to access key areas such as the Baltics or Poland. These relative weaknesses within NATO could increase the attractiveness to Russia of a fait-accompli.”

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loops

Politiskā griba kā militāro spēju faktors


[..] Russia’s military escalation against Ukraine in August 2016 demonstrated that Putin would rather use the threat of force to strengthen Russia’s position at the negotiating table rather than escalate to a large-scale war of attrition when swift military victory is unattainable.26 Forwarddeployed “tripwire” U.S. and allied forces capable of preventing Russian elite units from attaining rapid decisive victories would remove a critical method from Putin’s playbook.[..]

[..] Putin’s establishment of A2/AD zones across Europe and the Middle East make U.S. engagement with Russian forces more difficult and expensive, but far from impossible. The S-300 and S-400 air defense systems are mobile, have been deployed in numbers so as to create redundancies in Russia’s air defense
network, and are supported by a number of short-range air defense systems to cover close engagements. U.S. forces are nevertheless capable of penetrating the exclusion zones created by these systems. A successful defeat of a Russian air defense unit would require first jamming and partially disabling the system, followed by a ‘hard kill’ strike from a stealth aircraft once the system has been damaged. The deployment and use of these U.S. capabilities would be expensive and time consuming. It would require extensive planning and sufficient political will to oversee these and follow-on operations. It is well within the capacity of the American military to accomplish these tasks, however. Putin is counting on the deterrent capabilities of Russia’s air defense systems to preclude U.S. action and trusting that Washington will acquiesce to his policies rather than undertake these complicated strikes. [..]

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vara bungas: Labs (jo īss)  the Institute for the Study of War apkopojums par 2016.gadu un ieskats 2017.gadā. Daudz atsauču uz materiāliem, kas kādam var noderēt pētījumos. ISW tāpat kā citas domnīcas uzskata, ka šogad Putins gatavs nostaigāt  gar “kara malu”, bet ticamāk biedēs nevis uzbruks. Katrā gadījumā tas sakrīt ar daudzreiz VB izskanējušām domām, ka līdz ar kanaku ierašanos tagadējā LV apdraudējuma trijotne:

1.zibenskarš

2.hibrīdkara ne-militārā fāze

3.hibrīdkara militārā fāze

mainās vietām iespējamības reitingā:  1.hibrīdkara ne-militārā fāze;  2.hibrīdkara militārā fāze; 3. zibenskarš.

Vērā ņemams ir raksta autora akcents uz “political will” – US politisko gribu, kurai  jābūt ļoti koncentrētai un fokusētai, lai  spētu darbos nevis vārdos līdzsvarot RU A2/AD Baltijas jūrā.

Savukārt,  piemēram,  SE ar politisko gribēšanu viss ir kārtībā (problēmas ir ar varēšanu) par ko liecina RBS-15 pretkuģu raķešu sistēmu dislokācijas atjaunošana  Gotlandē, kas izrādās ir politiskās direktīvas radošais izpildījums.

[..] The spur for this initiative, said Engevall, was a high-priority directive from the government to significantly increase operational capability across the entire Swedish Armed Forces by 2020. While the re-activation of the RBS15 mobile coastal systems for the Swedish Navy was not directly specified in the directive, it was clearly ‘in the spirit’ of the given task. “That directive was issued by the government, and all our efforts are now going into this. So, essentially we have reacted to the political will – but we have also demonstrated that we are able to do things like this.”[..]

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Bail iedomāties, ko tik visu nepaveiktu NBS vadība, ja tik pat radoši lasītu valdības direktīvas 🙂

Fact check


[..] Новость о новейших российских БРК на побережье Балтийского моря за считаные часы стала одной из самых рейтинговых в отечественных и зарубежных СМИ. Курьез в том, что первые сообщения о развертывании «Балов» и «Бастионов» в Калининградской области появились достаточно давно. [..] об этом в интервью «Красной звезде» упомянул командующий Балтийским флотом вице-адмирал Александр Носатов. [..] Достаточно беглых математических вычислений, чтобы понять: «Балы» и «Бастионы» не только простреливают значительную часть территории Польши, ФРГ и стран Прибалтики, но и фактически закрывают вход в Балтийское море. Конечно, такой факт не может не тревожить НАТО. [..]  Возникает резонный вопрос: а куда смотрела разведка Североатлантического альянса? [..]

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vara bungas: Tovarsch korrespondent, ne nado pizdet pered strojem! Vsjo mi zametili. Nosatov naznachen v sentajbre,  ispolnajet objazannosti s ijunja 2016. goda. A pro Bastioni  mi pisali jescho v fevrale.