Category Archives: Arktika

Dienas grauds


[..] Why do we spend billions on defence, if we are not immediately threatened? For some countries—Israel, Latvia come to mind—the answer is self-evident. Countries that face a clear and immediate existential challenge know they need to spend on military and foreign policy. And they know why. [..]

Chrystina Freeland, CA ārlietu ministre

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runas esence Turpināt lasīt

Dienas grauds


[..] К сожалению, пока мы фокусируемся на старых методах, Россия уже создает новые. Самая непосредственная проблема – быстро тающая Арктика, которую НАТО оставил без внимания после холодной войны. Россия перевела на Дальний Север две военные бригады, а летом откроет там новую крупную военную базу. Кроме того, она укрепляет расположенные в этом регионе атомные сооружения. У США есть всего один пригодный для морской навигации ледокол, и даже он уже на 10 лет превысил свой срок службы. У России их 40 и она строит новые, снабженные крылатыми ракетами и морскими пушками.[..]

E.Lukas

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vara bungas:  Nu re, arī E.Lukas pamanīja RU – US brēcošo disproporciju ledlaužu flotēs. Tas protams arī agrāk nebija nekāds noslēpums, bet vienkārši norāda uz atšķirīgām prioritātēm. Līdz ar to RU  šobrīd ir 5-10 gadu handikaps Arktikā.

vēl

Strategic depth and Alliances


Corporal Frisk

“American newspaper – the concept of strategic depth: Finland could withdraw to Sweden if attacked”

That is the headline chosen by Finnish news source Verkkouutiset when retelling Jane’s Defence Weekly’s recent story that the Swedish Air Force has been working on a concept of enabling Finnish fighters to operate from Swedish bases in times of crises. The idea is both extremely radical, and blatantly obvious, a combination uncomfortably common in Finnish national security.

In short, the interviewed officer was colonel Magnus Liljegren, responsible for the production of Swedish air units and equipment at the Swedish Defence Forces’ general staff (designated C PROD FLYG in the Swedish Defence Forces). The colonel stated that “Finland is absolutely our top priority partner right now […] they are looking to us in order to increase their operational depth. If they need to withdraw they can move into our country and use our bases.” (full…

Skatīt ziņu 1  544 more words

Darba svētki


[..] Exercise Arrow 17, led by the Finnish Army’s Armoured Brigade, will take place in Pohjankangas, Niinisalo, Finland, from 2 to 13 May 2017. The objective of the exercise is to enhance interoperability and capability of mechanized units in offensive combat.[..] The exercise brings to Finland a reinforced US Army Europe infantry company of approximately 125 soldiers equipped with armoured Stryker personnel carrier vehicles as well as a Norwegian Brigade North mechanized platoon of approximately 50 soldiers equipped with CV90 infantry fighting vehicles. In addition, the exercise will include an instruction session on armour tactics with participants from Sweden, Denmark, and Estonia.

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vara bungas: Pirms gada līdzīgas force on force  mācības ar US dalību izraisīja FI opozīcijas šūmēšanos un FI AM skaidrošanos. Šogad ne pīkstiena. Dīvaini. Atbalsts FI dalībai NATO jau 48 %.

Vēji Baltijas jūras reģionā


[..] Broadly speaking, two scenarios for a Russian campaign in the BSR (Baltic Sea Reģion) appear possible:

  1. A low-key, possibly opportunistic, campaign that exploits real or manufactured discontent among Russian compatriots to destabilize one or more of the Baltic States, creating a “frozen conflict” that undermines NATO’s credibility; or

  2. A more structured, high-tempo campaign to achieve the same objectives against NATO power in the BSR and also render Nordic defense cooperation redundant.

It is reasonable to assume that the Baltic Sea Fleet and other organs of Russian maritime power will play supporting rather than leading roles in any such conflict. [..]

vara bungas:  Labs ieskats RU hibridkara spējās  Baltijas jūras reģiona griezumā. Var piekrist autoriem par RU Baltijas flotes sekundāro nozīmi eventuālās hibrīdās agresijas gadījumā.  Jūras ceļu blokāde tas ir maksimums.

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Bez pārsteigumiem


[..] “We have reiterated our high opinion on the policy of Sweden and, also, Finland that adhere to the nonaligned course in military affairs,” Lavrov said. “We see it as an important token of regional stability in the Baltic region and Europe in general.”

Wallstrom, for her part, said that “Sweden’s policy of nonalignment with military blocs is solid.” [..]

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vara bungas:  RU pozīcija ir skaidra, SE pozīcija ir saprotama. Ja kaut kas retorikā mainītos, tas nozīmētu vētru. Uz 23.02.2017. viss pa vecam – bezvējš.

Būsim pazīstami – Kanāda


vara bungas: LV sabiedrībai jāsāk apgūt līdz šim diezgan eksotiskas vieskaravīru atšķirības zīmes. Sāksim ar Kanādas sauszemes spēkiem:

Turpināt lasīt

high North, high tension


“It’s a full-spectrum press [for Russia] in the Arctic. NATO broadly, and Canada in particular, have the idea of ‘high North, low tension.’  I get that. But it’s hard to ignore the military buildup that’s going on in the Arctic Ocean.”

James Stavridis, a retired U.S navy admiral, former supreme allied NATO commander

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vara bungas: Interesanti būs pavērot CA vingrošanu balansējot lozungus par RU-CA sadarbību  Arktikā ar integrāciju NBS. Unikāla situācija arī mums, kuri par Arktiku tikai sapņo. Jāsaka, ka RU reaģē uz “kanādas hokeistu tuvošanos “sarkanās mašīnas” aizsardzības zonai” ļoti maigi, kritikas CA virzienā tik pat kā nav vai nu tā ir ļoti saudzējoša, acīmredzot RU plāno izspēlēt CA pret US.

Vizualizēts A2/AD


vara bungas: Labāk vienu reizi A2/AD kupolus ieraudzīt, nekā simts reizes par to dzirdēt.  Karte ir interaktīva. Jāpiezīmē, ka autori vadījās no konservatīviem pieņēmumiem par RU raķešu tāldarbību.

“…In the event of a crisis, such deployments would complicate NATO’s ability to access key areas such as the Baltics or Poland. These relative weaknesses within NATO could increase the attractiveness to Russia of a fait-accompli.”

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loops

Dienas grauds


[..] If the current nightmare scenario would come true, and NATO would experience a significant split, one of the more likely scenarios is a reforming of smaller alliances by countries which share the same outlook on national threats in general and the Kremlin in particular. These ‘non-moderated’ alliances would be smaller, but their greater cohesion would also mean that their response time would be faster and that their unity would be harder to manipulate. As such they would be a new kind of adversary for Putin, and one which the current Russian campaign would be ill-suited to meet.[..]

Robin Häggblom

Turpināt lasīt