” [..] The Russkiy Mir Foundation runs 41 centers of Russian culture in EU member states, including 27 centers at EU universities (see Table 3). The largest number of centers was opened at universities in the United Kingdom, Italy, Hungary, and Poland, followed by Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic,Latvia, and Romania.[..]”
vara bungas: Ļoti vērtīgs hibrīdkara ceļvedis. Kremlis+eksperts = kremsperts. Kremsperti nestaigā T-kreklā ar uzrakstu “Vezhlivije ludi” un bieži pauž visnotaļ liberālus vai RU varai viegli opozicionārus uzskatus, tomēr viņiem maksā par kremļa naratīva izplatīšanu izmantojot jūs kā puķpodu šo ideju sēklas iestādīšanai. Izaugs vai neizaugs no tās sēklas kaut kas, tas ir cits jautājums, kremspertam galvenais “iestādīt” 🙂 Pirms uzticēties vai noticēt vienam otram labam ekspertam (kādi ir visi pētījumā norādītie kremsperti) jāpārliecinās vai viņš vai viņa neapkalpo kremli. To var izdarīt samērā viegli noskaidrojot, kādu iestādi RU vai Rietumos viņi pārstāv, kā likums kurš maksā tas arī pasūta mūziku.
Interesanti, ka LV tabulā Nr.3 pārstāvēta ar divām kremspertu iestādēm, LT ar vienu, bet EE sarakstā nav vispār. Laikam EE kaut ko zina…
[..] Estonia’s Foreign Intelligence Service chief recently acknowledged that there is a network of politicians, journalists, diplomats and businesspeople operating in his country as agents of Russian influence.[..]
We call on Western governments:
• to officially acknowledge the threat posed by Russia’s hostile subversive information warfare,which strives to undermine our democratic and liberal values while manipulating our governments and societies by means of distorting truth on an industrial scale;
• to re-focus financial support for Russia-related academic programs from culture and history to in-depth analysis of Russia’s authoritarianism, kleptocracy and corrupt practices, such as state-sponsored propaganda and information warfare, militant foreign policy, violations of international law, and abuse of human rights;
• to issue special recommendations to their institutions of education and research, urging them to temporarily refrain from cooperation and acceptance of financial donations from Russian “soft power” organizations like Rossotrudnichestvo, the Russkiy Mir foundation, and the Gorchakov foundation.
We call on Western education and research institutions:
• to adopt mechanisms safeguarding the integrity of their policies and practices, including a temporary freeze on cooperation programs with Russia and screening of its financing;
• to update their due diligence rules with respect to receipt of (supposedly) private funding from Russia, making it more transparent and ethical to prevent any forms of malign Russian influence through Kremlin-friendly oligarchs. Updated due diligence policies should include a verification procedure conducted by independent and credible third-party watchdogs that focuses on the Kremlin’s strategies of subversion. The due diligence process should be based on a close study of Russian language sources and not be limited to
superficial reviews of the activities of potential donors to Western academic institutions.
We call on Western civil society and the expert community:
• to step up efforts to expose Russia’s network of agents of influence by monitoring academic and research institutions to reveal propaganda content disguised as scholarly debates, and investigate further the extent and implications of connections between the Western expert community and the Kremlin;
• to pay special attention to media outlets that publish analytical Russia-related content that whitewashes the Kremlin, promotes Moscow’s propaganda narratives and policy objectives. The sources of funding and political/business affiliations of such outlets, as well as Western contributors, who legitimize and promote soft forms of pro-Russian propaganda, require continuous scrutiny;
• to be vigilant and mindful of covert Russian intelligence activities, remembering that FSB traditionally targeted Western journalists and scholars at forums, conferences, festivals, and sporting events held in Russia to recruit them as agents of influence. Decisions regarding
attendance of conferences, roundtables and other events held in Russia must
take into account awareness of likely attempts by the Russian secret services to place Western participants in various compromising situations.