Konspekts 2017

[..] And therein lies the problem for the European Union: The bloc has been breaking apart for several years, but without France – a founding member whose alliance with Germany was the basis for its very formation – its dissolution is likely irreversible. In the ensuing crisis, the union would fragment into smaller regional groups. Questions about the future of the eurozone would trigger a run on Southern Europe’s banks and precipitate the collapse of the currency area.

Ahead of its own general election in September or October, Germany will try to keep the European Union united. But it will be difficult for Berlin to do so. The members of the ruling coalition, composed of center-right and center-left parties, will try to distinguish themselves from one another before the vote, during which the government in Berlin will avoid making any significant decisions on EU issues. Conflicting national interests among EU members will also make consensus on EU reform difficult to find. (One of the few areas where Germany and its EU peers can find some degree of understanding, however, is defense and security.)[..]

[..]France, Italy, Austria and Greece will end up seeking a more balanced relationship with Russia, while countries that tend to be more vulnerable to its vagaries – Poland, Romania, the Baltics and Sweden – will band together to fend off what they see as potential Russian aggression. Germany will try to play both sides, something that will be increasingly difficult to do as it also fights to keep the eurozone intact. Germany’s distraction will, in turn, enable Poland to emerge as a stronger leader in Eastern Europe, extending political, economic and military support to those endangered by the West’s weakened resolve.[..]

[..]Even a hint of reconciliation between Moscow and Washington will echo throughout Russia’s borderlands. Russia will almost certainly maintain its military presence in eastern Ukraine, but the United States and some European countries will adopt a more flexible interpretation of the Minsk protocols to justify the easing of sanctions. And because this will leave the government in Kiev more vulnerable to Russian coercion, Ukraine can be expected to intensify military, political and economic ties with Poland and the Baltic states. [..]

[..]For all the opportunity Russia has abroad in 2017, it will have perhaps even more challenges at home. Even if it pulls itself out of recession, it still faces a prolonged period of stagnation, and the government will have to adhere to a conservative budget until oil prices rise meaningfully again. [..]

avots: STRATFOR 2017. Forecast

vara bungas:  Man šķiet svarīgi divi momenti:

  1. par FR un DE vēlēšanu iznākumu   svarīgākas ir  RU ekonomikas attiecības ar  naftas cenām. Vienvārdsakot viss pa vecam 🙂
  2.  komanda ar TĀDU reputāciju, ka stratforam pat nepiemin BY Eiropas 2017.gada notikumu kontekstā. Man šķiet tas ir ļoti nepareizi.

Kopumā sanāk mēs steigsim PL virzienā, kur mūs jau gaidīs   UA un LT.  Par EE un SE es nebūtu tik drošs. STRATFORs sludina Intermariumu?


6 responses to “Konspekts 2017

  1. kā ar kontekstu par Mejas tuvākām attiecībām ar Baltijas valstīm, vismaz līdz Brexitam (un varbūt arī pēc tam)? varbūt UK arī jāieslēdz mūsu reģiona vienādojumā?

  2. Agris Purviņš

    Jāieslēdz visu ko var ieslēgt, bet pirmām kārtām jāpaļaujas uz sevi. UK mūs vēsturiski ir gan balstījusi, gan smagi dvēselē ieķēzījusi. LIelvaru atbalsts ir foršs, bet dikti riskants.

  3. UK tad lai atdod visus atlikušos, ripot spējīgos CVRT, tai skaitā arī tos, kas varbūt vairs īsti neripo, bet detaļām noderētu.


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