Inaugurācijas Dienas grauds

[..] 25 years, the fundamental question regarding NATO was not raised in polite company – that is, in the company of NATO countries’ leadership. That question, from the American point of view, divides into three parts. First, with the Soviet Union gone, what is NATO’s purpose? Second, how does NATO serve the American national interest? Third, given the fact that the EU has almost as large a GDP and almost 200 million more people than the U.S., why isn’t Europe’s collective contribution to NATO’s military capability larger than the U.S.’? By contribution, I don’t simply mean money, but a suitably large, trained and equipped force able to support the wars that are being fought now.

George Friedman, Geopolitical Futures


vara bungas: Rakstā ir arī visai interesantas atbildes uz šiem un citiem  mums aktuāliem jautājumiem. Ļoti atklāts un loģisks teksts, kas pārTRUMPo visu, ko gadiem ilgi lej mūsu politologi.  Prasās iztulkot latviski, būs laiks izdarīšu. Bet re, kā sākuši runāt …

” [..] Europeans must face two facts. First, this is 2017, and the wars that matter to the U.S. are being fought in the Islamic world. Second, this is not 1955, and Europe is not struggling to recover from World War II. It is a wealthy region, and its military capabilities should be equal to those of the U.S.[..]

viss raksts zemāk

NATO and the United States

The president-elect has pointed out a reality many choose to ignore

George Friedman

President-elect Donald Trump deeply upset the Europeans by raising the possibility that NATO is obsolete and that the European Union is failing. This is not the first time these issues have been raised. Many in the United States have raised questions about Europe’s commitment to NATO and to its relationship with the U.S. Many Europeans also have made the observation that the EU is failing. What Trump has done is simply bring into the open the question of Europe’s relationship with the U.S.

This question has been on the table for 25 years, since the Soviet Union collapsed. NATO was an alliance with a single purpose: to protect Western Europe from a Soviet invasion. That was a clear and understandable goal in the interest of all concerned. The military structure that was created was directed toward that end. And it reflected the relative economic and military strength of each party at the time of NATO’s founding. The Europeans bore the geographical risk. Any war would be fought on their territory, and their forces would face the first wave of an attack. In the long term, American reinforcements, air power and, in an extreme case, nuclear weapons would protect Europe. The foundation of the relationship was that Europe, with the best will, could not afford to build a sufficient defensive force. The U.S. was the indispensable force that could deter and defeat a Soviet attack.

The basic structure of NATO did not change in 1991. What happened was an expansion to include the former Soviet satellite states and the Baltic states. Little military consideration was given to that expansion. Europe no longer faced a military threat. The motive behind the expansion was to bring these countries into the framework of the Western defense system to give them confidence in their independence and help support the development of democracies on the Continent.The motivation was roughly the same as for expanding the EU. The bloc was primarily an economic entity. It expanded its membership without serious thought to its economic mission. Simply being an EU member was believed to enhance prosperity, so that even the economically weakest countries would become robust after attaining membership. The real motive was to expand the EU as far as possible, to integrate as much of Europe as possible into the political and social culture that the union guaranteed. As with NATO, EU expansion had less to do with the EU’s primary mission than with political and ideological factors.The EU question is ultimately a European problem. The U.S. can’t save it, and it won’t collapse because of American opinion. Here, the Europeans must take responsibility for what happens. But NATO is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It includes Canada and the United States. It is an alliance, and the U.S. has important and legitimate interests.For 25 years, the fundamental question regarding NATO was not raised in polite company – that is, in the company of NATO countries’ leadership. That question, from the American point of view, divides into three parts. First, with the Soviet Union gone, what is NATO’s purpose? Second, how does NATO serve the American national interest? Third, given the fact that the EU has almost as large a GDP and almost 200 million more people than the U.S., why isn’t Europe’s collective contribution to NATO’s military capability larger than the U.S.’? By contribution, I don’t simply mean money, but a suitably large, trained and equipped force able to support the wars that are being fought now.

The automatic answer to the first question is that NATO’s purpose is to guarantee its members’ security. On the second question, it can’t be argued that NATO has served American interests since 1991. For the last 15 years, the U.S. has been engaged in wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and other Muslim countries. Whether wise or not, these wars have been waged to different degrees under both Republican and Democratic administrations. NATO is a military alliance and one of its members, the United States, has been involved in wars for 15 years. NATO as an institution has not devoted anywhere near the military force it could afford to any of these wars.

It is true that NATO’s area of responsibility is focused on Europe, and the U.S.’ current wars are outside of this area. But from the American point of view, maintaining an alliance with a region where large-scale warfare is unlikely makes little sense. The place where the U.S. needs a large commitment from allies is outside of Europe. NATO must evolve with the needs of its members, and if it can’t, it can be seen (as Trump put it) as obsolete, an alliance created to fight a war that will not happen, and unable to fight a war that has happened.

It is certainly true that NATO committed itself to fighting in Afghanistan. Many countries sent contingents. Some, like the Germans, were not permitted to engage in offensive operations, others were too small to be anything more than symbolic. Everything taken together was insufficient to affect the strategic balance on the battlefield. They were there in spirit, but wars are fought with large numbers of troops and equipment. This brings us to the third question – the size of the European force. A military alliance requires a military, and many European countries, in times of prosperity as well as constraint, have chosen not to create a force large enough to support American interests. Their unwillingness to do so has created a reality, which is that even when NATO commits to fighting alongside the Americans, European capabilities limit their contribution to the margins.

NATO chose not to support the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. This may well have been wise on its part. But the reality was the following. The U.S. was attacked on 9/11. The initial response was in Afghanistan. The U.S. chose to carry out a follow-on action, in the same conflict, in Iraq. The NATO alliance refused to commit itself to this. Some members fought alongside the U.S., particularly Britain, along with some smaller countries. But France and Germany refused.

This was their right as sovereign states. But in exercising that right, they radically reshaped their relationship with the U.S. They would participate in a U.S.-led war if it was in their self-interests. The U.S. could not assume it would receive their automatic support. In that case, the question is what does an alliance with France, Germany and others mean? The issue is not what NATO’s charter says. That charter is obsolete and must evolve to account for new conditions. The issue also is not whether the U.S. was starting a new war in Iraq or continuing the one that began in Afghanistan. The diplomats can argue that as they wish. The issue is that the U.S. was engaged in wars for 15 years, and there was no automatic support from NATO or major European countries in those wars. The countries that wanted to participate fought, with as much or as little as they chose to send. Those that wanted to fight in one war and not the other did. And those that didn’t want to get involved in any wars or arranged to be unable to engage, fought in neither.

Nations have the right and obligation to carry out their foreign and military policies as they wish. But an alliance constrains nations to behave in a certain way given certain events. An alliance is a pooling of sovereignty. It is absolutely true that NATO wasn’t conceived to fight wars outside of Europe. Nor was it conceived as an organization where the primary military burden falls on the Europeans. But Europeans must face two facts. First, this is 2017, and the wars that matter to the U.S. are being fought in the Islamic world. Second, this is not 1955, and Europe is not struggling to recover from World War II. It is a wealthy region, and its military capabilities should be equal to those of the U.S.

There is a long argument to be had about the wisdom of U.S. policy in the Middle East. It may well be that those countries that limited their involvement in those wars made a wise choice. But that also means that there is no alliance in any practical sense. The U.S. was at war in two countries with multidivisional forces. Each NATO country sent what it chose to Afghanistan. Many chose not to go to Iraq.

This was not an alliance action, but individual European countries making the decisions that best suited them. That cannot be criticized, but this does not constitute an alliance. NATO is obsolete if it defines its responsibility primarily to repel a Russian invasion, especially since it refused to create a military force capable of doing that. It is obsolete in that its original mission is gone. It is obsolete in that it regards the U.S. as the guarantor of Europe’s security, when Europe is quite capable of incurring the cost of self-defense. If European nations are free to follow their own interests, then so is the United States.

When we step back from the argument between the U.S. and Europe on NATO, we see a broader reality. First, the European Union is fragmenting and that fragmentation necessarily affects NATO. Europe is in no position to undertake unanimously supported NATO operations. Nor is it in a position to incur the political costs of a massive military buildup. For the Europeans, NATO is important because it guarantees that, in the extraordinary circumstance of a European war, the U.S. is, under treaty, required to be there.

The United States has other interests. It is interested in preventing Russian hegemony over the European Peninsula, but the U.S. can effectively address that by placing limited forces in the Baltics, Poland and Romania. Just as the Europeans have devolved NATO into bilateral relations between the U.S. and each NATO member, the United States can do the same. Similarly, the U.S. can accept the status quo in Ukraine, written or unwritten. Kiev has a pro-Western government, the east is a de facto autonomous region, and the rights of ethnic Russians in Sevastopol are guaranteed by the Russians. The U.S. is not going to war in Ukraine, and Russia is not going to war there, either.

Trump’s approach to NATO has been forced on the U.S. by the Europeans and would be on the table with a different president. NATO doesn’t function as an alliance. It is a group of sovereign nations that will respond to American requests as they see fit. The U.S. understands this, and inevitably, the veil of good manners was going to be torn away. Someone was going to point out that NATO is obsolete. Trump happened to enjoy saying it.

But whether it is a tragedy or comedy, the matter can be summed up the following way. The Europeans are wondering if the U.S. will leave NATO. The U.S. is wondering if the Europeans will join NATO. Forgetting NATO, the question is this. What is the commitment of European countries to the United States, and what is the American commitment to Europe? It is not clear that there is a geopolitical basis for this commitment any longer. Interests have diverged, NATO is not suited to the realities of today, and the U.S.’ relations with European states differ from nation to nation, as do European nations’ relations to the United States


39 responses to “Inaugurācijas Dienas grauds

  1. Ja tā padomā, tad NATO tā pa īstam svarīga bija tikai mums un varbūt poļiem. Rietumeiropa – viņiem viss ir labi, vismaz kamēr melnie nenāca. ASV – kā rakstā diezgan labi aprakstīts, tad baigo labumu NATO nedod.

    • Ja to būtu uzrakstījis kāds cits autors, varētu pasmīkņāt, bet Frīdmens ir megalabs analītiķis. Ja kāds vēl nav lasījis viņa grāmatu nākamie 100 gadi iesaku.
      Cita lieta, ka arī viņš līdz pēdējam brīdim nepiedāvāja šādu versiju, iespējams tādēļ ka neparedzēja Trampa uzvaru un cerēja ka US kā pasaules lāpneša politika tā vai savādāk turpināsies.
      Atkal pierādās ka par paļaušanos uz optimiskāko nākotnes scenāriju jāmaksā ar pazaudēto laiku.

      • Grāmatu esmu lasījis. intersanti un loģiski. To, ka krievi neļaus Ukrainai aiziet, viņš prognozēja, lai arī karu īsti nē – vismaz ne tai grāmatā.

        Principā, man tā grāmata patika, jo pēc tās tuvāko 7 gadu laikā mēs kopā ar amīšiem sagrausim Krieviju.

        • nu UA kara arī nav, juridiski… ja saies ragos Rietumi nevar nevinnēt, arī ilgtermiņā ekonomiski, bet man nepatīk pašreizējā LV ķīlnieku loma un viktīmā uzvedība, kas nedod tiesības uz lapām no kopējās uzvaras lauru vainaga.

    • Joks beigās arī labs:
      Eiropieši štuko vai tik US izstāsies no NATO, kamēr US gaida kad beidzot eiropieši iestāsies NATO 🙂

    • Amerikāņiem NATO ir tikpat vajadzīgs cik eiropiešiem. Un gan vieniem gan otriem tas ir vajadzīgs viena iemesla pēc – miers un drošība Eiropā. EU ir lielākais investors ASV. Un vari trīs reizes minēt uz kurieni dosies eiropiešu bēgļu straumes kara gadījumā. Un ir vēl arī daudzi citi iemesli kāpēc NATO amerikāņiem ir svarīgs – pieeja infrastruktūrai, pieeja izlūkošanas datiem, labs ieroču noieta tirgus utt, utt.

      • Tapēc Frīdmens saka: kā NATO mūs atbalstīja Afaganistānā, tā mēs NATO Eiropā. Proporcionāli. Darām cik varam. Bet LV par NATO vēl svarīgāka bija Obamas apņemšnās ” ja kas” palīdzēt divpusēji, negaidot NATO reakciju.

  2. Agris Purviņš

    “Wars are fought with large numbers of troops and equipment”. Mūsu AM stratēģi un NBS komandieri domā savādāk. Izskatās, ka mēs kļūstam par ļoti unikālu valsti ar savu unikālo redzējumu visās lietās.

    • tikai viens jautājums. Pieņemu, ka tiem kam (nato) jāzin, ir informēti, kas šeit ir, kas notiek un kādā virzienā virzās procesi / plāni. Kāpēc mums vienīgajiem reģionā “ļauj” nodarboties ar militārajām inovācijām?

      • Faktiskā vara pieder Krievijas ietekmes aģentiem – Šķēlem, Lembergam, krievu naudas mazgātājiem un ar iepriekšējiem saistītiem. Krievu specdienestu infiltrācija tik dziļa, ka tiesībsargājošās struktūras daļēji rīcības nespējīgas. Politiskajā arēnā alternatīvas trūkums – sistēma vairāk vai mazāk visus “pārgremojusi”. Tauta apātiska, ievērojami rusificēta. Mana versija, noteikti realitātei neatbilst 100%.

        • viss ok sadaļā izglītība, ekonomikas politika utt. NBS un aizsardzības politika nav īsti atrauajami no NATO (de facto). Šeit tā disonanse veidojas.

        • arī zemessargs

          Ne gluži, bez krievu naudas tranzītā un bandītu sīkbankām, ievērojamā vara ir arī skandināvu bankām un būvniekiem. Būvnieki ir lielā mērā ieinteresēti krievu naudā. Bankas nav, bet tie izrāda pasivitāti visos jautājumos kas viņus vismaz netieši neskar. Un izskatās vai nu ir vienojušies ar Krieviju par kompensācijām gadījumā “ja nu kas” vai nu ir vienkārši ļoti tuvredzīgi. Politiskā arēnā meinstrīmā ir tie, kuri apkalpo vismaz vienu no lielajiem ekonomiskajiem grupējumiem (tranzīts, bankas, būvnieki). Tā kā tauta samest neatkarīgai politikai nav gatava, tad tautas intereses pārstāv mazākums.

      • arī zemessargs

        Tāpēc kā līdz šim nebija pieņemts pārāk skarbi kritizēt suverēnās valsts iekšpolitiku.

  3. Pārsvarā jau ļoti ļoģisks un pašsaprotams teksts , nekā radikāla tur nav…….bet par to, ka pēc ASV domām nav iemesla kapēc EU nevarētu tērēt tikpat daudz naudas un būvēt armiju līdzvērtīgu US army vēl ir dažas nianses.

    EU nav vienota valsts tā kā USA, nav vienotas politikas un protams nav vienotas militārās sfēras un nekā līdzīga vienotai EU armijai. Tapēc jau ir tā, ka dažas valstis tērē tos 2%, un citas nav pat tuvu tam. Un pat ja tērētu visi 2%, pat tad būtu grūti izveidot kaut kādu normālu smago spēku, jo visām EU dalībvalstīm ir savas intereses un politikas. Bez nopietnas federalizācijas tur neiztikt.

    Sanāk nedaudz smieklīgi – Trumps grib lai Eiropieši beidz uz amerikāņiem paļauties un paši tiek galā ar savu aizsardzību, bet viņs arī ir anti-globālists un atbalstija Brexit. Tad viņs nemaz negrib vienotu EU armiju, jo viņs redzami ir pret EU federalizāciju…

  4. Labs G. Fridmana raksts. NATO nepieciešams reformēt un transformēt. Pēc būtības NATO pārvērtās par milzīgu birokrātisku aparātu, kur viena valsts citai notirgo vidēji vecus vai pa visam vecus ieročus. Cilvēki NATO struktūrās veido karjeras un organizē savu darba dzīvi, tādās jomās kā loģistika, finanšu plānošana, konsultēšana militārās jomās, plānošana, analītika utt. Paralēli iepriekšminēto darba katra valsts atsevišķi, pie tam bieži nedaloties ar datiem ar NATO struktūrām. Īsāk sakot no malas viss izskatās gludi un monolīti, bet ja iet detaļās, tad tā nav.

    • A.Sprūds aizvakar intervijā pieminēja “spērienu pa dibenu” Eiropai nepieciešamību un lietderību. Tā kā zelta pendeļu teorija aiziet tautās😊 Apjukumu elitēs jāizmanto pozitīvu programmu piedāvāšanai.

  5. Noskatijos Trumpa iecelšanu amatā……nedaudz baisi palieka….ukraiņiem tagad varētu būt diezgan traki.

    • Nepaņems nato? I netaisījās. Nepaņems EU? Tāpat nav gatavi. Pārējais pašu rokās. Baltkrieviju gan ir žēl.

    • Ukrainas problēma ir tā, ka pēc 2014. gada nenomainījās politiskā elite un principā pie varas ir tie paši cilvēki, tikai tgd sauc citus lozungus. Starp citu interesanti, ka Ukrainas prezidentam Krievijā ir rūpnīcas un neviens tās neaiztiek, līdz ar to kas patiesībā tur notiek, mums arī nav zināms. Presē tomēr ir samērā liela propogadna.

      • mums arī 1991.gadā daudz kur nekas nenomainījās 🙂 dzīvojam tomēr.

        • Dzīvot jau dzīvojam, jo cilvēki pie visa pielāgojās, bet vai tas tiešām ir tas, ko cilvēki vēlējās 1991. gadā pie mums un ukraiņi 2005. un 2014. gados? Pamata problema bija konflikts starp valsts varu un parastiem iedzīvotājiem, jo valsts vara dzīvoja citā ekonomiskā un kvalitatīvajā telpā nekā parastie cilvēki un nedeva iespēju attīstīties un pašrealizēties. Pašlaik jau tās pašas problēmas nekur nav pazudušas, valsts vara pie mums dzīvo savu dzīvi un parastie cilvēki savu, ko pierāda ēnu ekonomika un izbraukušo skaits.

          Par plaisu runājot, šeit ir militāras tematikas blogs, tad pieminēšu, cik ir gadījumi armijā, kad vadība meklē jebkādu iemeslu, lai nemaksātu izdienas pensiju vai ierobežo karavīru tiesības. Valsts varas attieksme ir šāda, kamēr esi vajadzīgs labi, kad vairs neesi, tu mums neinteresē. Lai nebūtu tā, ka es runāju tukšus vārdus, piemēram, Administratīvās apgabaltiesas 19.10.2016. spriedums lietā Nr. A420458611, spriedums atrodams pie anonimizētajiem spriedumiem.

      • Anonīmais Labvēlis

        Kurš tad laidīs postā tādas iedarbības sviras.

  6. Fragments no Trumpa inaugurācijas runas:
    “For many decades, we’ve … subsidized the armies of other countries, while allowing for the very sad depletion of our military.
    We’ve defended other nations’ borders, while refusing to defend our own, and spent trillions and trillions of dollars overseas”

    Izklausās pēc izolacionisma. 1. un 2. pasaules karu sākumā ASV bija neitrālas.

    • Jā teiktais īstenosies darbos, tas būs visas līdšinējās LV aizsardzības politikas krahs. Kopš 2004.gada visas “zelta olas” liktas vienā grozā – kolektīvā aizsardzība un uzņemošās valsts uzdevumi. Vēl protams jāsagaida vēlēšanas FR un DE.

      • Ne tikai LV. Taivāna, Dienvidkoreja, visa Arābija, Balkāni paļaujas uz pasaules galveno policistu. Ja Trumps ieviesīs, ko sludina, Eiropai būs jākļūst arī par militāro lielvaru, jo ES tuvumā ir pārāk daudz esošu un potenciālu konfliktu, pat neskaitot Krieviju.
        Diemžēl nav redzams kā Eiropa var kļūt par to, ko vajadzētu būt.

        • Atļaujos līdz galam nepiekrist.

          D-koreja un Japāna ir Trampa kategorija “krist uz nerviem Ķīnai” – tiem nekas nedraud.

          Mēs tomēr esam “reinforce old alliances” kastē.

          Nervus grauž BY un ukraiņi. Moldāvi arī.

          • foreign policy based on American interests, we will embrace diplomacy. The world must know that we do not go abroad in search of enemies, that we are always happy when old enemies become friends, and when old friends become allies.

            • Nu, līdz šim šis ir maksimāli kacinājis (sarkano) Ķīnu, attiecīgi nepametīs valstis kas līdz šim mērķim.

              Kas ir kategorijā draugi par sabiedrotajiem? Vells viņu zin, īpasi ja solās neeksportēt ASV vērtības.

              • Mans domāt viņi (administrācija) paši vēl nezina 🙂 A mēs te mokamies… Lielājos vilcienos US nekas neapdraud un viņiem nav pamata piekāpties neviena priekšā, pat ne Ķīnas un ne jau Krievijas. Ko RU reāli var piedāvāt par atļauu veidot buferzonu ap savām robežām. Neko. Līdz ar to vienīgā lielā nesadaļitā loze ir palikusi Arktika. Kādam ir vēl idejas, kāds globālais aktīvs var interesēt gan US gan RU un kas vēl nav sadalīts, jo neba US pieteiksies uz Sibīriju vai RU uz Kaliforniju.

            • Pats Trumps runā tieši, skaidri un agresīvi. Turpretim padomnieki nolīdzina viņa teikto un paši runā maigāk. Tāpēc arī Baltā Nama lapā ir piegludināts teksts.
              Trumps jau ir paspējis atkāpties no dažiem saviem apgalvojumiem, piemēram pa Klintones arestu. Jācer, ka arī viņa teksti par NATO un Putinu ir tikai skaļas frāzes.

              • Par Klintomes arestu un daudz kas cits it kā Trampa teiktais ir preses tiražētas interpretācijas vai pat meli. Par Klintoni viņš neteica, ka viņa tiks arestēta, viņš teica (tas nav precīzs citāts, bet būtības atstāsts pēc atmiņas), ka ja viņš būtu prezidents, tad konstatējot tādu pārkāpumu kā izdarījusi Klintone, vainīgais tiktu aizturēts. Nevis, ka nākot viņam pie varas, Klintone tiks arestēta.

                Un šādas melīgas interpretācijas prese tiražē nepārtraukti. Pie mums virsrakstos par Trampu vispār gandrīz vienmēr ir meli vai interpretācijas, kas neatbilst patiesībai. Bieži pat pašā ziņas tekstā ir pateikts pavisam kas cits un ne tik skaļš vai skandalozs kā ir virsrakstā.

                Tā kā, ja kait kur kāds grib atsaukties uz Trampa teikto, silti iesaku pārbaudīt ziņas oriģināl – izlasot viņa pašā rakstīto tvītā vai teikto intervijā vai noskatoties viņa runāto video. Savādāk citējot presi, īpaši mūsējo, var negribot stipri sameloties.

                • Solīja izmeklēt lietu, bet tagad no šīs domas ir atteicies, jo Hilarija tomēr lāga tante un Klintoni daudz ASV labā darījuši.
                  Par to, ka viņš saka vienu un pēc laika apgalvo, ka nekad neko tādu nav teicis ir populāra komiķu (Stephen Colbert, Trevor Noah, u.c) tēma, kas uzrok twītus un video ar viņa apgalvojumiem.

        • arī zemessargs

          Ne gluži. Taivānā un Dienvidkorejā ir stipras armijas.


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