Politiskā griba kā militāro spēju faktors

[..] Russia’s military escalation against Ukraine in August 2016 demonstrated that Putin would rather use the threat of force to strengthen Russia’s position at the negotiating table rather than escalate to a large-scale war of attrition when swift military victory is unattainable.26 Forwarddeployed “tripwire” U.S. and allied forces capable of preventing Russian elite units from attaining rapid decisive victories would remove a critical method from Putin’s playbook.[..]

[..] Putin’s establishment of A2/AD zones across Europe and the Middle East make U.S. engagement with Russian forces more difficult and expensive, but far from impossible. The S-300 and S-400 air defense systems are mobile, have been deployed in numbers so as to create redundancies in Russia’s air defense
network, and are supported by a number of short-range air defense systems to cover close engagements. U.S. forces are nevertheless capable of penetrating the exclusion zones created by these systems. A successful defeat of a Russian air defense unit would require first jamming and partially disabling the system, followed by a ‘hard kill’ strike from a stealth aircraft once the system has been damaged. The deployment and use of these U.S. capabilities would be expensive and time consuming. It would require extensive planning and sufficient political will to oversee these and follow-on operations. It is well within the capacity of the American military to accomplish these tasks, however. Putin is counting on the deterrent capabilities of Russia’s air defense systems to preclude U.S. action and trusting that Washington will acquiesce to his policies rather than undertake these complicated strikes. [..]

avots

vara bungas: Labs (jo īss)  the Institute for the Study of War apkopojums par 2016.gadu un ieskats 2017.gadā. Daudz atsauču uz materiāliem, kas kādam var noderēt pētījumos. ISW tāpat kā citas domnīcas uzskata, ka šogad Putins gatavs nostaigāt  gar “kara malu”, bet ticamāk biedēs nevis uzbruks. Katrā gadījumā tas sakrīt ar daudzreiz VB izskanējušām domām, ka līdz ar kanaku ierašanos tagadējā LV apdraudējuma trijotne:

1.zibenskarš

2.hibrīdkara ne-militārā fāze

3.hibrīdkara militārā fāze

mainās vietām iespējamības reitingā:  1.hibrīdkara ne-militārā fāze;  2.hibrīdkara militārā fāze; 3. zibenskarš.

Vērā ņemams ir raksta autora akcents uz “political will” – US politisko gribu, kurai  jābūt ļoti koncentrētai un fokusētai, lai  spētu darbos nevis vārdos līdzsvarot RU A2/AD Baltijas jūrā.

Savukārt,  piemēram,  SE ar politisko gribēšanu viss ir kārtībā (problēmas ir ar varēšanu) par ko liecina RBS-15 pretkuģu raķešu sistēmu dislokācijas atjaunošana  Gotlandē, kas izrādās ir politiskās direktīvas radošais izpildījums.

[..] The spur for this initiative, said Engevall, was a high-priority directive from the government to significantly increase operational capability across the entire Swedish Armed Forces by 2020. While the re-activation of the RBS15 mobile coastal systems for the Swedish Navy was not directly specified in the directive, it was clearly ‘in the spirit’ of the given task. “That directive was issued by the government, and all our efforts are now going into this. So, essentially we have reacted to the political will – but we have also demonstrated that we are able to do things like this.”[..]

avots

Bail iedomāties, ko tik visu nepaveiktu NBS vadība, ja tik pat radoši lasītu valdības direktīvas 🙂

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4 responses to “Politiskā griba kā militāro spēju faktors

  1. Gvardes Leitnants

    Labs un noderīgs materiāls attieksmju pret aizsardzību salīdzināšanai un ne tikai varēšanas prizmā, bet jo īpaši gribēšanas (political will) rakursā, salīdzinot mūsu Dievzemīti kaut vai ar Z un D tiešajiem robežu kaimiņiem.

    Tautas valodā runājot, praktiski nekļūdīgu diagnozi “political will” stāvoklim var noteikt pēc padarītā savlaicīguma, kvalitātes, vajadzīgās kvantitātes un atbilstības esošajai (un prognizējamajai) situācijai.

    Savukārt, zinātniski izsakoties, gribēšanas (political will) stāvokli var noteikt pēc darbības vai bezdarbības rakstura pēc zināmās formulas: KAS GRIB KAUR KO PANĀKT (PAVEIKT), TAS MEKLĒ UN ATROD TAM IESPĒJAS. KAS NEGRIB NEKO PAVEIKT- TAS ARĪ MEKLĒ UN ARĪ ATROD IEMESLUS, LAI NEDARĪTU.

    Lūdzu dariet zināmas atsauces uz tām valdības direktīvām aizsardzības jomā, kuras PIEĻAUTU to traktējumu par labu reālu pasākumu veikšanai aizsardzības uzlabošanai pat pie pareizi motivētas AM un NBS ( kādi tie, manuprāt , nav- spriežot pēc “padarītā”, “neda- darītā” un vienkārši “neizdarītā”).

    Paldies;)

  2. Re ko Špīgelī vācu militārpersonas saka par Trumpa galveno stratēģi Flinu, kas turpmāk diriģēs USA ārpolitiku un drošības politiku (nekas iepriecinošs protams)

    “. A number of German military personnel also got to know Trump’s designated national security adviser, Michael Flynn, during the time he served as a senior staffer for American ISAF Commander Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan. The verdict among German military officials is as unanimous as it is scathing. “At best, he is useful as a locomotive fire tender and not as a strategist,” says one German military officer who has since retired.

    In Kabul, Flynn was thought to care little about collateral damage. Whereas his boss McChrystal always took pains to avoid civilian losses, Flynn seemed less concerned about killing innocent Afghans. One German officer says it is little wonder that Flynn never succeeded in getting promoted from a three-star to a four-star general. Soon, though, he will be sitting in the White House, where he will be tasked with coordinating U.S. security policy. Officials in Berlin are certain that those policies will not be overly friendly toward the trans-Atlantic alliance”

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