[..] Russia’s military escalation against Ukraine in August 2016 demonstrated that Putin would rather use the threat of force to strengthen Russia’s position at the negotiating table rather than escalate to a large-scale war of attrition when swift military victory is unattainable.26 Forwarddeployed “tripwire” U.S. and allied forces capable of preventing Russian elite units from attaining rapid decisive victories would remove a critical method from Putin’s playbook.[..]
[..] Putin’s establishment of A2/AD zones across Europe and the Middle East make U.S. engagement with Russian forces more difficult and expensive, but far from impossible. The S-300 and S-400 air defense systems are mobile, have been deployed in numbers so as to create redundancies in Russia’s air defense
network, and are supported by a number of short-range air defense systems to cover close engagements. U.S. forces are nevertheless capable of penetrating the exclusion zones created by these systems. A successful defeat of a Russian air defense unit would require first jamming and partially disabling the system, followed by a ‘hard kill’ strike from a stealth aircraft once the system has been damaged. The deployment and use of these U.S. capabilities would be expensive and time consuming. It would require extensive planning and sufficient political will to oversee these and follow-on operations. It is well within the capacity of the American military to accomplish these tasks, however. Putin is counting on the deterrent capabilities of Russia’s air defense systems to preclude U.S. action and trusting that Washington will acquiesce to his policies rather than undertake these complicated strikes. [..]
vara bungas: Labs (jo īss) the Institute for the Study of War apkopojums par 2016.gadu un ieskats 2017.gadā. Daudz atsauču uz materiāliem, kas kādam var noderēt pētījumos. ISW tāpat kā citas domnīcas uzskata, ka šogad Putins gatavs nostaigāt gar “kara malu”, bet ticamāk biedēs nevis uzbruks. Katrā gadījumā tas sakrīt ar daudzreiz VB izskanējušām domām, ka līdz ar kanaku ierašanos tagadējā LV apdraudējuma trijotne:
2.hibrīdkara ne-militārā fāze
3.hibrīdkara militārā fāze
mainās vietām iespējamības reitingā: 1.hibrīdkara ne-militārā fāze; 2.hibrīdkara militārā fāze; 3. zibenskarš.
Vērā ņemams ir raksta autora akcents uz “political will” – US politisko gribu, kurai jābūt ļoti koncentrētai un fokusētai, lai spētu darbos nevis vārdos līdzsvarot RU A2/AD Baltijas jūrā.
Savukārt, piemēram, SE ar politisko gribēšanu viss ir kārtībā (problēmas ir ar varēšanu) par ko liecina RBS-15 pretkuģu raķešu sistēmu dislokācijas atjaunošana Gotlandē, kas izrādās ir politiskās direktīvas radošais izpildījums.
[..] The spur for this initiative, said Engevall, was a high-priority directive from the government to significantly increase operational capability across the entire Swedish Armed Forces by 2020. While the re-activation of the RBS15 mobile coastal systems for the Swedish Navy was not directly specified in the directive, it was clearly ‘in the spirit’ of the given task. “That directive was issued by the government, and all our efforts are now going into this. So, essentially we have reacted to the political will – but we have also demonstrated that we are able to do things like this.”[..]
Bail iedomāties, ko tik visu nepaveiktu NBS vadība, ja tik pat radoši lasītu valdības direktīvas 🙂