The Russian military continues to attribute importance to nonstrategic nuclear weapons for use by naval, tactical air, and air- and missile-defense forces, as well as on short-range ballistic missiles. Part of the rationale is that nonstrategic nuclear weapons are needed to offset the superior conventional forces of NATO, and particularly the United States. Russia also appears to be motivated by a need to counter China’s large and increasingly capable conventional forces in the Far East, and by the fact that having a sizable inventory of nonstrategic nuclear weapons helps Moscow keep overall nuclear parity with the combined nuclear forces of the United States, Britain, and France.
We estimate that Russia has roughly 2000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads assigned for delivery by air, naval, and various defensive forces.10 Like the US government, the Russian government does not provide any information on how many or what kinds of nonstrategic nuclear weapons it possesses. We estimate that the Russian inventory is declining and will continue to do so over the next decade with or without an arms control agreement. The Russian government has repeatedly said that all of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons are in central storage.
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vara bungas: Taktisko kodolieroču (TNW) skaistums slēpjas apstāklī, ka uz pretinieku tiek izdarīts spiediens tikai ar to vien, ka tiek mainīta TNW glabāšanas vieta. Šobrīd RU taktiskie ņuki it kā tiek glabāti centralizēti. Līdz ar to eskalācija notiks jau brīdī, kad paziņos, ka piemēram RU Melnās un Baltijas jūras flotes ir saņēmušas kodolmunīciju glabāšanai savos arsenālos. Turklāt nav nozīmes vai TNW pagales tikušas jebkad izņemtas no šiem arsenāliem 🙂