[..] The ongoing tribulations of the A-10 have done a great deal to obscure the history of what the A-10 was designed for, the environment it was intended to operate in, and the support assets that would have been available. While the A-10 was designed to be a dedicated CAS aircraft, the implicit assumption was that a Wild Weasel and standoff jammer mix would support A-10 operations, particularly in Europe. F-4G Wild Weasel doctrine at the time was to target SAM acquisition radars, depriving Soviet divisional air defense of cueing and forcing air defense operators into a struggle to acquire targets visually. In Europe, with low cloud ceilings, poor visibility, and rolling terrain, this was a good bet when coupled with low altitude operations. It paid off in Desert Storm, when the electronic combat triad wrecked the radar-dependent portions of the Iraqi integrated air defense strikes. Discussions today regarding a contested environment are focused on building an aircraft that is survivable over the modern battlefield, ignoring the external capabilities that ensured that the A-10 only had to survive against a threat dominated by anti-aircraft artillery and small missiles. The notion of “high-threat CAS” is nonsense. There is no piece of magic aircraft design or technological prowess that will enable an aircraft to loiter over a dispersed target with credible, radar-guided self-defense capabilities. [..]
vara bungas: kādas ir NBS REC (radioelektroniskās cīņas – electronic warfare EW) spējas? … ! Kādām jābūt?