A government-commissioned, independent assessment of the effects of Finland’s possible NATO membership issued on Friday says that Finland’s expanded partnership status with NATO is as close to the limit that it can reach without being a full member. Full membership would probably lead to a serious crisis with Russia, according to the report.
vara bungas: Somijas dalību NATO izlems Krievija. Kā saka attiecības sasniedza augstāko pakāpi, drīz jābūt kāzām.
somu pētnieki šādi redz RU reakciju uz FI dalību NATO:
[..] Fenno-Russian relations would take a beating and the political reaction would be harsh and probably also “personal”, as in the case of the downing of a Russian fighter plane by the Turkish Air Force during the Syrian conflict. The unexpected and unprovoked breach of the border regime in Northern Finland in late 2015 is an example of Russia’s propensity to create a problem, then leverage it and offer to manage it without necessarily solving it. Russian reactions could also include increased pressure on the borders with the Baltic States. An attempt to politically activate the ethnic Russians living in Finland may also be considered. During the accession process, the atmosphere would be poisoned and trade could be badly hit, along lines currently experienced in the Turkish-Russian dispute. As a backdrop to the domestic enlargement debate, the traditional Finnish bilateral agenda would be in a shambles, even if Norway’s ability as a NATO member to sustain a similar “Russian agenda” points to the reversibility of such a state of affairs.[..]
interesanti, ka somi vērš uzmanību uz to pašu apstākli, ko bieži min VB, iekš NATO stāsies FI, bet spriedze augs gar RU-Baltijas robežu. Asimetrija kāda tā ir. Tāpat mūsu domas sakrīt, ka par stāšanos vai nestāšanos NATO SE un FI jālemj kopīgi. Palikt vienatnē jūras krastā būtu stūlbi.
Tajā pat laikā no FI un SE dalības NATO somi redz vislielāko labumu tieši Baltijas valstīm
[..] No doubt, the Baltic States would view Finnish membership and extending the NATO-Russia border as contributing to shifting the tension between them and Russia to the north. Finnish accession could, as it were, entail sharing the burden of tension along a much longer NATO-Russia frontier. They would no longer, with Norway and Poland, be the only frontline states. Should Sweden also apply, this would in practical terms greatly increase the strategic depth of Baltic defence and transform the Nordic/Baltic area into a common strategic space. This would facilitate further military integration between the Baltic States and the new member(s). Defending these republics today is a logistical challenge of the first order. [..]
pilns ziņojuma teksts šeit
UPD 2 FI/SE mācības
UPD 3 [..]But hidden in the report is one much more important point, or rather, two points: to NATO, strengthening the defensive capabilities of the Baltic States is a challenge. One of the priorities of NATO is the capability to bring allied forced to the Baltic States – whether to do this through the so-called Suwalki corridor between Kaliningrad and Belarus, just 112 kilometers wide and thus vulnerable, or past Kaliningrad and potentially through Sweden and Finland. And there it is: potentially through Sweden and Finland.[..]