Conclusions and recommendations
- The Russian threat has to be clearly acknowledged, treated as a strategic long-term challenge and taken fully into account in NATO’s defence planning and future posture in the Baltic Sea area.
- Effective deterrence requires a clearly increased presence of Allied forces in the region. NATO’s forward defence has to move from a symbolic to a meaningful presence.
- The Alliance’s forward presence must balance two key aspects: military effectiveness and multinationality. Military effectiveness requires the forces to be combat ready. The United States should exercise leadership by providing the framework and certain key capabilities, which would then be complemented by contributions from other Allies.
- In terms of manoeuvre formations, the baseline consideration should be brigade-sized units. A continuous presence of two brigades would be necessary, in addition to the indigenous forces of the Baltic countries.
- An increased presence of air assets, including transition from Air Policing mission to Air Defence, and maintenance of a robust naval presence in the Baltic Sea, is required.
- The Baltic countries will need to allocate additional resources for the Host Nation Support, including the development of necessary infrastructure.
- Alongside the strengthening of the forward presence component, the Alliance needs to refine capabilities for the deployment of reinforcements and follow-on forces, and for the neutralization of Russia´s A2/AD capabilities. The Allies should demonstrate their ability, in collective defence exercises, to rapidly move large numbers of troops to the Baltic region.
vara bungas: obligāta lasāmviela visiem bungotājiem, igauņi pacentušies apkopot visu reģiona militāro pamatinformāciju vienā dokumentā (līdzīgus ražoja arī pēc mūsu AM pasūtījuma) un nu varam kārtējo reizi pārliecināties, ka mūsu argumenti un pieņēmumi būtiski neatšķiras no igauņu kolēģu domām. Svarīgi, lai šos pētījumus lasītu politiķi (vēlams pret parakstu), lai vēlāk netaisītu “lielas acis” par to, ka “nebija informācijas”. Progress novērojams arī tajā apstākllī, ka vēl nesen šādi pētījumi mūsu pīļu dīķī būtu absolūtais “top secret”. Līdz ar to mēs visi esam baigie malači, bet, ja jūs zinātu kā tracina “pokazuha” un simboliskie žesti no visām pusēm – pašmāju, NATO, Eiropas, amerikāņu…
[..] he VJTF should be able to deploy a lead element at 48 hours’ notice, with the rest of the force following within seven days. However, these timelines specify the force’s ability to start deploying, not its actual arrival in the theatre of operations. Because its units rotate and because it is not tied to any particular area of operations, the VJTF cannot have its equipment and supplies pre-positioned. Therefore, in reality, the actual arrival of troops with all their equipment is expected to take much longer.
Logistical hurdles in the way of rapid deployment would be greater if the framework nation was geographically distant from the Baltic theatre. 19 In addition, the actual arrival of the VJTF in the case of a crisis is not immediately assured. The SACEUR (NATO’s operational commander) has been given authority to initiate activities to prepare the VJTF for deployment, but the movement of troops would still require a prior political decision by the member states at the North Atlantic Council. Making this decision in a forum of 28 sovereign states will inevitably take some time. Therefore, the value of the VJTF as a quick responder and an effective instrument in combat operations is rather questionable. 20 It seems rather to be a political tool to demonstrate NATO’s solidarity and the multinational character of its response.