[..] More than one year after Wales, and despite tremendous efforts, it is becoming clear that the compromises which underlie the institutional reforms of the Alliance – the rejection of the forward defence strategy, the annual rotation of the troop-contributing nations, the renunciation of units permanently subordinate to the multinational corps – may well lead to considerable difficulties in the implementation. Taken together, these measures cannot sufficiently contribute to a credible deterrence toward Moscow and a reassurance of the eastern member states in both threat scenarios described above – subversion and coup de main. [..]
vara bungas: reti skaidra un precīza runa. Kopumā viss ir slikti, bet ne bezcerīgi, viss atkarīgs no tā kā Varšavā atrisinās šos trīs jautājumus:
[..] First, it will have to determine whether the deterioration in relations with Russia will continue for a sustained period – and whether, if the answer is yes, a “deterrence from a distance” through the current configurations of the VJTF and the NRF will be sufficient.
Second, it will have to touch the sensitive issue of the nuclear dimension, which, so as not to disturb efforts towards a détente with Russia has been almost completely neglected (at least publicly).
Third, facing at best stagnating national defence budgets and an ongoing lack of military capabilities, the member states will have to focus on the operational readiness of their respective armed forces. All these topics would severely tax the consensus of Wales and are likely to strain NATO solidarity.[..]